Next week, I’ll interview a forward-deployed Brigade Commander about his leadership experience and lessons.
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“I strive to be confident enough to convince people that I am in charge, but humble enough to realize that I am often going to be wrong.”
Rule #6 of Robert Sutton’s “12 Things Good Bosses Believe” is one that should resonate with military leaders. Typically, we do not have difficulty convincing people that we are in charge; the long history of service and discipline inherently gives authority to leaders/commanders.
Still, exerting authority at the right time/place does not come naturally for some, so it may be necessary to look for opportunities to lead with intention and assertiveness. But let’s be honest, most military leaders need to pay attention to second half of Sutton’s statement.
Being in charge doesn’t mean you’ll always be right. In fact, being a leader almost guarantees that your decisions will be wrong in at least some people’s eyes.
Leadership sometimes means making people mad.
– General Colin Powell
Sutton’s point is that sometimes leaders will be flat-out wrong, and the good one’s will:
TED – Dan Pink: The Puzzle of Motivation. Here is an illuminating talk that challenges the way we view rewards and performance.
– The promise of reward only works when performing basic or mechanical tasks.
– Reward actually impairs performance of even rudimentary cognitive tasks and stems creativity.
– Members perform best when they are given Autonomy, Mastery, and Purpose.
What place does Autonomy have in military organizations?
When do you incorporate rewards when leading your team?
In Deep Survival, author Laurence Gonzales describes how the brain assembles a “mental map” of the world based on spatial orientation, experience, emotion, cognition, and every other facet of who we are. This mental map is our unique perspective of the world. It’s our comfort zone; it’s what we rest on; it’s where we feel safe.
But there’s a problem in that our mental map doesn’t always align with “the real map”… i.e. the real world.
Gonzales relates numerous accounts in which people found themselves in survival situations and continued to cling to their old reality…the one where they were still sitting safely in a plane at 30,000 feet…or the one where a bear hadn’t just wrecked their campsite leaving them stranded. The people that died are the ones who failed to update their mental maps to their new situation.
The essential point is that sometimes there is a fate lying just around the corner that we have never, EVER considered, but will have to react to.
In March of 2008, such a “new fate” arrived in Sadr City, Iraq. The urban enclave of 2 million people in northeastern Baghdad had quieted down to the point that just two companies of Stryker Infantry were needed to contain it. We had regular meetings with local leaders and enemy attacks were very low. Some might say that we had reached “steady-state operations,” and a routine of stability. We were in a comfort zone.
But as the saying goes, the enemy gets a vote…and Muqtada al-Sadr’s vote came at the end of March, when he unleashed an hourly barrage of rocket, mortar, IED, RPG, and gunfire attacks on the Green Zone and units in the area. In a matter of hours, the tactical situation in Sadr City shifted from low to high-intensity, with engagements akin to the Black Hawk Down depiction of Mogadishu in 1993. The digital map erupted red icons all over the city as our units tried to get a handle on the emerging situation. The enemy had achieved surprise and units were sustaining casualties.
This post is not a narrative of the combat in Sadr City that year, but it does serve as a perfect example of a situation that requires leaders to reframe their mental maps to the new reality. Holding onto the prior trend of stability was pointless and risky. We needed a new plan, and fast.
The command deployed additional assets from surrounding areas and blocked the routes in/out of the city, then platoons fought their way north to reclaim a key road. Where two companies once occupied, 14 companies now stood. The resulting month-long fight ultimately reduced the Sadr militia’s combat power and a new 2.4 km wall across the city prevented them from affecting key coalition bases. From the Soldiers on the street to the Commanding General, the dramatic change in the tactical landscape demanded mental agility, measured emotional response, and poised leadership.
The lesson is that leaders must be open-minded enough to sense a changing environment, willing to discard what is comfortable and accept the new reality, and then be decisive in the new environment, not the old. Leaders also need to accept that unseen “realities” exist and have momentum along tracks that will ultimately intersect with and affect the organization. Muqtada al-Sadr had likely been planning the April 2008 offensive for months. Intelligence efforts, of course, seek to discover these initiatives, but leaders must live in a state of open-ended readiness to adjust and lead their organizations through change.
Check out General Stanley McChrystal’s LinkedIn article about the abrupt end to his Soldiering career. He discusses his mindset in light of the events.
Falls closely in line with Powell’s statement: “Never let your ego get so close to your position, that when your position goes, your ego goes with it.”
In his Modern War Institute article, Scott Ginther relayed 20 lessons from his path from West Point Cadet to Platoon Leader in Afghanistan. (Find it here.)
Much credit goes to then 1LT Ginther for clearly learning the right lessons as a young leader, and for taking the time to capture and share them with the force. I offer the following thoughts as an addendum to his insights, and intend them to show how the leadership environment changes in the transition from Lieutenant to Commander and Field Grade officer.
You seem to work longer hours than everyone else…
You feel totally indispensable…
You feel like you’re the only one who is energized…
You feel like no one else can do as good a job as you could on a project…
You know where this is going…if these statements describe you, you might not be delegating like you should.
Take a look at HBR’s article “Why Aren’t You Delegating?”
If you’re a military staff officer, you already feel overtasked. That’s the nature of our business; the military has far-reaching influence and responsibility that translates into ceaseless action. If you’re a commander, you can protect your unit from unnecessary tasks…to an extent. But there’s never a shortage of due-outs.
Two reasons why military leaders don’t delegate very well:
“Encouragement and inspiration characterize leadership whereas coercive techniques run counter to Army leadership principles. Subordinates respond well to leadership that encourages commitment to achieve shared goals, thus improving the leader’s ability to use indirect influence in situations where clear lines of authority do not exist. Leadership seeks to influence others through the communication of ideas and common causes. Positive, empowering influence comes by knowing how to lead, relate to others, and free other to manage tasks.”
– Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22 Army Leadership
Two points are worth noting about this paragraph from ADP 6-22 – Army Leadership.
“Not being toxic” is not enough for Army leadership. Our Soldiers and officers deserve more. They deserve leaders who build their leadership personas on positivity and inspiration, knowing that such an environment will allow their teams to accomplish more.